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This article makes a critical assessment of the operation of Article 4 of Rome II in English and 
Irish courts measuring the extent to which judges of England and Wales (hereafter England) and 
Ireland are interpreting Article 4 of Rome II in accordance with what the EU legislator intended.  
 




The law that applies to cross-border non-contractual obligations is of considerable significance. In 
the European Union (“EU”), cross-border non-contractual obligations are governed by Rome II 
Regulation.1 
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1Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations [2007] OJ L199/40 (“Rome II”). It takes effect in courts of Member States only for events 
giving rise to damage occurring after 11 January 2009, as decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
in Case C-412/10 Homawoo EU:C:2011:747 [37]. The English courts in Innovia Films Limited v Frito-Lay North America 
Inc [2012] EWHC 790 [100]; VTB Capital Plc v Nutritek International Corp [2012] EWCA Civ 808 [145]; and Alliance 
Bank JSC v Aquanta Corp [2012] EWCA [37]–[38] have followed the CJEU’s decision in Homawoo. However, Burton J 
in Alliance Bank [37]–[38] queries the CJEU’s decision as not clearing the doubt as to whether the date that applies is the 
one when the damage manifests itself or the event that gives rise to the resulting damage. He reluctantly prefers the former 
interpretation on the ground that Art 4(1) and Art 4(2) Rome II are concerned with the “law of the country where the 
damage occurs”, despite the fact that the escape clause in Art 4(3) apparently does not restrict itself to the general rules 
in Art 4(1) and Art 4(2). See also earlier English cases on the controversy as to when Rome II comes into operation: 
Bonsall v Cattolica Assicurazioni [2010] ILPR 45 [8]; Bacon v Nacional Suizaciga [2010] EHWC 2017 (QB) [61]; 
Homawoo v GMF Assurance [2010] EHWC 1941 [43]–[52]; Lucas Film Limited v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39 [91]; 
Hillside (New Media) Limited v Biarte Baasland [2010] EHWC 1941 (QB) [23]–[25].  
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The law that applies in the absence of choice2 for non-contractual obligations is the general 
rule.3 Article 4 of Rome II is the “central provision”4 of Rome II - it applies to all cross-border non-
contractual obligations that are not otherwise governed by specific rules.5 This explains why this 
article singles out Article 4 of Rome II for analysis. Rome II has now been in operation for over ten 
years and a common law jurisprudence6 on the operation of Article 4 has developed; thus, it is an area 
ripe for analysis. 
This article focuses on all the decided cases on Article 4 of Rome II in English and Irish 
courts.7 It makes a key contribution in its critical assessment of the extent to which judges of England 
and Ireland are interpreting Article 4 of Rome II in accordance with what the EU legislator intended. 
The United Kingdom’s exit from the EU (“Brexit”)8 and its possible effect upon the operation 
of Article 4 of Rome II is beyond the scope of this article.9 As Professor Dickinson rightly submits, 
any discussion on how private international law would be affected by Brexit is speculative.10 We 
decline the honour to engage in such speculation. 
Part B of this article briefly outlines the framework of Article 4 of Rome II, C critically 
analyses the operation of Article 4(1) of Rome II, D critically analyses the operation of Article 4(2) 
of Rome II, E critically analyses the operation of Article 4(3) of Rome II and F gives a conclusion. 
 
B. Framework of Article 4 of Rome II Regulation 
It is important to set out the terms of Article 4 of Rome II for the sake of clarity: 
 
2See Art 14 of Rome II on party autonomy for non-contractual obligations. 
3See Folkes v Generali Assurances [2019] EWHC 801 (QB) [8] (Nicol J). Cf. Art 3 of Rome I Regulation (Regulation 
(EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations [2008] OJ L177/6 (“Rome I”). Art 29 Rome I provides that it shall apply from 17 December 2009. It replaces 
the Rome Convention - [1980] OJ L266.) See also Recital 11 to Rome I. 
4SC Symeonides, “Rome II and Tort Conflicts: A Missed Opportunity” (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 
173, 186. 
5See Arts 5-12 of Rome II. 
6In common law jurisprudence, L Collins (ed) Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (15th edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2012) and A Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Oxford 
University Press, 2008) are very influential texts on the subject of Rome II. Indeed, very recently Bryan J in Angola v 
Perfectbit Ltd [2018] EWHC 965 (Comm) [200] crowned these works as “the leading texts” on the subject of Rome II. 
See also J Ahern and W Binchy (eds.), The Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual-Obligations: 
A New International Litigation Regime (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009).    
7English and Irish courts are also referred to as “Common law courts” in this article. 
8On 24th June 2016 the majority of the United Kingdom voted in a referendum to leave the European Union triggering 
Art 50 of the Treaty of the European Union. 
9See for example A Dickinson, “Back to the Future: the UK’s EU Exit and the Conflict of Laws” (2016) 12 Journal of 
Private International Law 195; E Lein, “Unchartered territory? A few thoughts on Private International law Post Brexit” 
(2015/2016) XVII Yearbook of Private International Law 33; M Pilich, “Brexit and EU Private International Law: May 
the EU Stay in?” (2017) Maastricht Journal of  European and Comparative Law 1-17; J Fitchen,“The Private International 
Law Consequences of Brexit” (2017) 35 Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 411-432; G Rühl, “Judicial Cooperation 
In Civil And Commercial Matters After Brexit: which way forward?” (2018) 67 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 99; Z Tang, “UK-EU Civil Judicial Co-operation after Brexit: Five Models” (2018) 43 European Law Review 
648. 
10Dickinson (n 9).   
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1.   Unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation 
arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of 
the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or 
countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur. 
2.   However, where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage both have their 
habitual residence in the same country at the time when the damage occurs, the law of that country 
shall apply. 
3.   Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely 
connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country 
shall apply. A manifestly closer connection with another country might be based in particular on a pre-
existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the 
tort/delict in question. 
The common law case law applying Article 4 of Rome II tells us five things about Article 4’s 
framework. First, it is to be applied autonomously.11 Second, it excludes judge made dépeçage.12 
Third, it excludes substantive justice principles or better law approach.13 Fourth, it prevails over 
recitals.14  Fifth, it is affected by matters of common law procedure and evidence15 such that the 
applicable law is determined tentatively in interlocutory proceedings,16 and the onus is on the parties 
(not the judge) to prove the content of foreign law, if not the judge would assume that foreign law is 
the same as the law of the forum.17    
 
 
11Recital 11 to Rome II. See generally Ertse Group Bank AG, London Branch v JSC ‘VMZ’ Red October & Ors [2015] 
EWCA Civ 379 [90]–[96]; Hillside (n 1) [28]. See also Committeri v Club Mediterranee Sa Generali Assurances Iard Sa 
[2016] EWHC 1510 [33], [40]–[49]. For pre-Rome II law on this subject see Phillips v Eyre [1870] L.R. 6 QB 1, 28; Boys 
v Chaplin [1971] AC 356; Red Sea Insurance Co. Ltd. Appellant v Bouygues S.A [1995] 3 WLR 926; S 11 and 12 of the 
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995.     
12See generally ICDL GCC Foundation FZ-LLC and others v European Computer Driving Licence Foundation Ltd [2011] 
IEHC 343 [9.7] (Clarke J); Alfa Laval Tumba AB & Alfa Laval Krakow v Separator Spares International Ltd [2012] 
EWHC 1155 [21] – [24] (Arnold J); Case C-133/08 Intercontainer Interfrigo SC (ICF) v Balkenende Oosthuizen 
EU:C:2009:617 [42]-[49]; Giuliano-Lagarde Report [1980] OJ C282/1, 23. See also Jacobs v MIB [2010] EWHC 231 
[46] (Owen J); Stylianou v Toyoshima [2013] EWHC 2188 (QB) (Sir Robert Nelson J); Fortress Value Fund v Blue Skye 
Fund [2013] EWHC (Comm) 1486; Wall v Mutuelle de Poitiers Assurances [2014] EWCA Civ 138 [16]-[20] (Longmore 
LJ), [34]-[36] (Jackson LJ), [47]-[53] (Christopher Clarke LJ); Winrow v Hemphill [2015] I.L.Pr. 12 [45] (Slade J); 
Moreno v The Motor Insurer’s Bureau [2015] EWCA Civ 379 [43], [73]–[78] (Gilbart J); Erste Group (ibid) [91]. 
13See generally Jacobs (ibid); Winrow (ibid). See also  DF Cavers, “A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem” (1933) 47 
Harvard Law Review 173; FC Von Savigny, Private International Law - A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (William 
Guthrie trans, T & T Law Publishers, 1869) 110-11,114, 248. 
14Stylianou (n 12) [33], [75]–[78]; Winrow (n 12) [58]-[59]. 
15Art 1(3) of Rome II. See also Art 1(3) of Rome II. 
16Allied Irish Bank Plc and others v Diamond and others [2011] IEHC 505; Alfa Laval (n 12); Alliance Bank (n 1); 
Stylianou  (n 12) [22]; Fortress Value (n 12) [56]–[59]; Erste Group (n 11) [99]. See also C&F Green Energy Ltd & anor 
v Bakker Magnetics BV [2015] IEHC 773 and Banque Cantonale de Genéve v Plolevent Ltd and others [2015] EWHC 
1968 (Comm) (Teare J).   
17Alliance Bank JSC v Aquanta Corporation [2011] EWHC 3281 (Comm) [41] (Burton J); Stylianou (n 12) [22]; OPO v 
MLA [2014] EWCA Civ 1277 [108]-[111] (Arden LJ); James Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 [121] (Lord Neuberger); 
Lady Christine Brownlie v Four seasons Holdings Incorporated (“Brownlie “) [2015] EWCA Civ 665 [45], [89], [92] 
(Arden LJ); Fundo Soberano de Angola v Jose Filomeno dos Santos [2018] EWHC 2199 (Comm) [32] (Popplewell J); 
Tremendous Success Holdings Ltd v Sinosoft Technology Group Ltd [2016] HKEC 1509 (Anita Yip J) [45]. 
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C. Article 4(1) of Rome II Regulation 
Article 4 (1) of Rome II is the principal connecting factor under Rome II. In this connection Recital 
18 to Rome II provides that: “The general rule in this Regulation should be the lex loci damni provided 
for in Article 4(1).” Recitals 16 and 17 provide the following guidance on Article 4(1) of Rome II: 
  
(16) Uniform rules should enhance the foreseeability of court decisions and ensure a reasonable 
balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person who has sustained 
damage. A connection with the country where the direct damage occurred (lex loci damni) strikes a 
fair balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining the 
damage, and also reflects the modern approach to civil liability and the development of systems of 
strict liability.  
(17) The law applicable should be determined on the basis of where the damage occurs, regardless of 
the country or countries in which the indirect consequences could occur. Accordingly, in cases of 
personal injury or damage to property, the country in which the damage occurs should be the country 
where the injury was sustained or the property was damaged respectively.  
Some other points are worth noting. First, Article 4(1) of Rome II is a fixed rule and not a 
presumption.18 Article 4(1) of Rome II is not in the same form or structure as Article 4(2) of the Rome 
Convention. Article 4(2) of the Rome Convention is a presumption of closest connection for 
contractual obligations, while Article 4(1) of Rome II is the general rule embodying the principal 
connecting factor that indicates the law, which applies for non-contractual obligations. 
Second, common law judges agree that the time at which the damage is sustained, is used in 
applying Article 4(1) of Rome II, and not the time at which proceedings are instituted.19 For example, 
if A injures B in a traffic accident, the time at which damage is sustained is the moment the injury 
occurred during the road accident. Any other damage B suffers at the time of instituting proceedings 
is irrelevant under Article 4(1) of Rome II. Moreover, any other damage sustained at the time of 
instituting the proceedings in court would constitute the country in which the indirect consequences 
of that event occur, and is clearly irrelevant for the purpose of Article 4(1). 
Third, common law judges agree that Article 4(1) of Rome II is applied to damage that has 
occurred,20 and “not likely to occur.”21 For example if there is a threat that the actions of A are likely 
to cause financial damage to B. B cannot invoke Article 4(1) because the financial damage is yet to 
occur. 
 
18Moreno (n 12) [47]. 
19See generally Daniela Bianco v Anthony J Bennett [2015] EWHC 626 (QB) [28]. See also Jacobs (n 12); Winrow (n 12) 
[46].   
20Cf. Art 7(2) of Brussels Ia in the allocation of jurisdiction for non-contractual obligations in the EU applies the 
connecting factor of the place of harmful event to damage that has occurred or may occur. 
21OPO (n 17) [112] (Arden LJ). 
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There are two controversial issues raised in respect of Article 4(1) of Rome II in common law 
courts. First, is Article 4 of Rome II to be given an equivalent or parallel interpretation with Article 
7(2) of Brussels Ia22 and its predecessor instruments?23 Second, what solution is to be applied where 
the place of damage occurs in different countries simultaneously? These issues are considered 
separately. 
 
1. Coherence between Article 4(1) of Rome II Regulation and Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia. 
Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia provides that: 
A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State in matters relating to 
tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.  
In effect, Article 4(1) of Rome II applies the lex loci damni to choice of law for non-contractual 
obligations, while Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia applies the place of harmful event to non-contractual 
obligations in the EU allocation of jurisdiction. 
It is important to note that there is a real conceptual distinction between the lex loci damni 
under Article 4 of Rome II, and the place of harmful event in Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia. The lex loci 
damni under Article 4 of Rome II is only concerned with where the victim suffered direct damage,24 
while the place of harmful event under Article 7 (2) Brussels Ia covers the place giving rise to the 
damage, and the place where the direct damage occurred.25 In other words, Article 4 of Rome II 
excludes the place giving rise to the direct damage. This distinction is key. 
To make the above point concrete, reference is made to locus classicus of Bier v Mines de 
Potasse d' Alsace (“Bier”),26 which created the choice between the place giving rise to the damage 
and the place where the damage manifests itself in the EU allocation of jurisdiction rules for non-
contractual obligations. The Bier case involved a claim by the claimant against the defendant for a 
harmful event caused by pollution into the River Rhine in France, which allegedly caused damage to 
the claimant’s plantations in The Netherlands. The ECJ held that the claimant could either sue in 
 
22Council Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 [2012] 
OJ L351/1 (“Brussels Ia”). 
23Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, as amended [1998] OJ 
C27/1 (“Brussels Convention”); Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2001] OJ L12/1 (“Brussels I Regulation”).   
24See also ED&F Man Capital Markets Ltd v Come Harvest Holdings Ltd [2019] EWHC 1661 (Comm) [61] (Daniel 
Toledano QC).  
25See generally Case C-21/76 Bier, EU:C:1976:166; Case C-220/88, Dumez France, EU:C:1990:8; Case C-68/93 Shevill, 
EU:C:1995:6; Case C-364/93, Marinari EU:C:1995:289; Case C-167/00, Verein für Konsumenteninformation 
EU:C:2002:555; Case C-18/02, Danmarks EU:C:2004:74; Case C-189/08, Zuid-Chemie EU:C:2009:475 [24]; Case C-
133/11, Folien Fischer EU:C:2012:664; Case C-228/11, Melzer EU:C:2013:305; Case C-147/12,  Öfab EU:C:2013:490; 
Case C-45/13, Kainz EU:C:2014:7 [27]; Case C-572/14, Austro-Mechana EU:C:2013:515; Case  C-352/13, Hydrogen 





France (place giving rise to the damage) or The Netherlands (place where the direct damage manifests 
itself). If the Bier case were to be considered in the context of Article 4(1) of Rome II, only Dutch 
law would be applicable since it is the place of direct damage and not the place giving rise to the 
damage (France). 
What remains open to question is whether a parallel or equivalent interpretation of the concept 
of direct damage under Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia should mirror Article 4(1) of Rome II, given that 
they both exclude indirect consequences of the non-contractual obligation.27 Recital 7 to Rome II 
shows that this question is resolved in the positive: 
The substantive scope and the provisions of this Regulation should be consistent with Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I) and the instruments dealing 
with the law applicable to contractual obligations.28 
Indeed, common law judges have adopted this approach of coherence of interpretation between 
Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia and Article 4(1) of Rome II.29 This approach is legitimate and correct. 
However, the CJEU has explicitly expressed reservations about the coherence of 
interpretation. In Kainz v. Pantherwerke AG, (“Kainz”)30 it held that: 
It must be stated next that, although it is apparent from recital 7 in the preamble to Regulation 864/2007 
that the European Union legislature sought to ensure consistency between Regulation 44/2001, on the one 
hand, and the substantive scope and the provisions of Regulation 864/2007, on the other, that does not 
mean, however, that the provisions of Regulation 44/2001 must for that reason be interpreted in the light 
of the provisions of Regulation 864/2007. The objective of consistency cannot, in any event, lead to the 
provisions of Regulation 44/2001 being interpreted in a manner which is unconnected to the scheme and 
objectives pursued by that Regulation.31 
Also in Lazar v. Allianz SPA,32 the central question referred to the CJEU for preliminary ruling by an 
Italian court was whether Article 4(1) of Rome II had to, in order to determine the law applicable to 
a non-contractual obligation arising from a road traffic accident, be interpreted as meaning that the 
damage arising from the death of a person in such an accident, which occurred in the Member State 
of the court siesed, sustained by close relatives of the deceased who resided in another Member State, 
had to be regarded as damage or as “indirect consequences” of that accident, within the meaning of 
 
27See also all cases in n 25. 
28See also recital 7 to Rome I. 
29See generally Hillside (n 1); Ertse Group (n 11).   
30 (Case C-45/13) EU:C:2014:7. The CJEU decided, after hearing AG Jääskinen, to proceed to judgment without an 
opinion. 
31 Ibid at [20]. 
32 (Case C-350/14) EU:C:2015:802. 
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that provision. Suffice it to say that in the Opinion of AG Wahl,33 and decision of the CJEU,34 they 
were “indirect consequences” of that accident under Article 4(1) of Rome II. 
AG Wahl made explicit reference to recital 7 to Rome II as a legal basis for his opinion.35 He 
relied on the explanatory report to Rome II,36 which made explicit reference to the case law of Article 
5(3) of both the Brussels Convention and Brussels I Regulation, to stress the point that both Article 
4(1) of Rome II and Article 5(3) of Brussels I make a distinction between direct and indirect damage.37 
He then justified his reference to the case law38 of Article 5(3) of Brussels Convention and Brussels 
I on the basis of coherence of interpretation. He said: 
although the objectives pursued by each of those legal acts are somewhat different, the concepts referred 
to in the Rome II Regulation must, as far as possible, be understood by reference to the interpretations 
adopted in connection with the Brussels Convention or the Brussels I Regulation. A degree of parallelism 
must be established in the interpretation of those notions in so far as the legal instruments all pursue an 
objective of the foreseeability of the solutions adopted.39 
Significantly, though the CJEU made explicit reference to recital 7 to Rome II as a legal basis for its 
decision, it did not explicitly apply the coherence of interpretation nor did it apply its case law under 
both Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention and Brussels I (as was done by AG Wahl in his Opinion). 
The CJEU reached its decision within the confines of Rome II.40 
In this connection, Professor Dickinson rightly submits that the CJEU “…wished to underplay 
the links between the two Regulations, and to encourage the future judicial development of the Rome 
II Regulation principally by reference to its own wording and objectives”.41 He also submits that: 
Although a weakening of the ties between the two Regulations might, by diluting the significance of 
comparative case law, prolong the period in which the interpretation of the Rome II Regulation’s rules 
remains unsettled and ferment the risk of inconsistency between national courts, a degree of independent 
interpretation may be no bad thing in the longer term: the character and objectives of rules of applicable 
law differ from those of rules of jurisdiction. Recital (7) presents no obstacle to an approach which allows 
the Rome II Regulation the freedom to develop independently, as consistency does not demand complete 
fidelity.42 
 
33 Opinion of AG Wahl in Case C-350/14, Lazar v. Allianz SPA, EU:C:2015:586 [85].  
34 (n 32) [30]. 
35 (n 33) [4], [49]. 
36 Explanatory memorandum from the Commission, accompanying the Proposal for Rome II, COM(2003) 427final 
(Explanatory Memorandum) 12. 
37 (n 33) [48]–[49].   
38 Bier (n 25); Dumez France (n 25); Shevill (n 25); Marinari  (n 25); Case C-168-02, Kronhofer EU:C:2004:364; Zuid-
Chemie (n 25). These cases were cited in the opinion of AG Wahl in Lazar (n 33) [55]-[65]. 
39Opinion of AG Wahl in Lazar (n 33) [52]. 
40For example the CJEU made explicit reference to Arts 2 and 15(c) & (f) of Rome II to justify its decision – an approach 
which AG Wahl did not take. See Lazar (n 32) [5], [6], [7], [22], [26], [27]. 





Whilst there is merit to Professor Dickinson’s view that equivalent concepts in Brussels Ia (and its 
predecessor instruments) should not be blindly applied to Rome II (and vice versa), it would seem 
odd that a coherence of interpretation between Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia and Article 4(1) of Rome II 
should not be the norm, when the foundation of direct damage for non-contractual obligations in EU 
private international law for civil and commercial matters is the jurisprudence of the ECJ interpreting 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention.43 
 The approach of explicitly utilising the coherence of interpretation in recital 7 to Rome II 
enriches the jurisprudence of the CJEU by making its judgment more robust, and simplifies the task 
for national courts. It would also reduce litigation and transaction costs for the parties in the sense 
that their lawyers will be almost certain that the concept of direct damage would be given an 
equivalent meaning under Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia and Article 4 of Rome II. The complexity of the 
work of the lawyer in advising the client is thus reduced. This also leads to sound administration of 
justice if clients can afford the services of lawyers because the task of the lawyer is simplified and 
the lawyer can advise the client in a timely manner. Indeed, if Brussels Ia and Rome II have equivalent 
concepts it is not a bad idea to carefully draw inspiration from previous jurisprudence of the CJEU 
that have applied those concepts. 
Fortunately common law judges have adopted this pragmatic approach in giving the concept 
of place of direct damage in Article 4(1) of Rome II and Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia an equivalent 
meaning. Thus, in Allen v. Deputy International Ltd,44 Stewart J in response to the caution expressed 
by the CJEU in Kainz,45 correctly held that: 
The fact that the Kainz case… determines that the provisions of Regulation 44/2001 must not, for the 
reason of consistency, be interpreted in the light of Rome II, does not mean that the converse should not 
apply. There is good reason for recital (7) to Rome II. It refers to consistency in the “substantial scope and 
provisions” (emphasis added). I accept that Rome II should not be a slave to the objective of consistency 
and that this objective should not lead to Rome II being interpreted in a manner unconnected to the scheme 
and objectives which it pursues. However, the court should where possible give effect to recital (7).46 
In Ertse Group,47 the English Court of Appeal was concerned with identifying the place of financial 
damage for the purpose of applying Article 4(1) of Rome II. The gist of the case was that the claimant 
made a claim for service out of jurisdiction on Russian defendants in respect of a loan agreement and 
guarantee that was subject to English law and jurisdiction. The claimant alleged that the Russian 
defendants conspired to put their assets beyond the reach of creditors. The place of payment in respect 
 
43 Explanatory Memorandum (n 36) 11. 
44 [2014] EWHC 753(QB). 
45 Kainz (n 30).   
46 Allen v Deputy International Ltd (n 44) [13] (footnote omitted). 
47 (n 11). 
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of the loan transaction was in New York. One of the questions before the Court was to determine the 
place where the financial damage occurred within the meaning of Article 4(1) of Rome II. 
Though the Court of Appeal conceded that Article 4 of Rome II and Article 5(3) of Brussels I 
were different in the sense that the “latter contemplates that a claimant in tort may choose between 
the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred and the place where the damage was 
sustained… the purpose of Rome II is to identify a single applicable law rather than a choice”,48 it 
held by expressly referring to recital 7 to Rome II that “the Rome II Regulation ought to be interpreted 
in a manner which is broadly in harmony with the jurisprudence and interpretation of similar 
provisions in the Judgments Regulation.”49 
The Court of Appeal also applied the CJEU jurisprudence in Article 5(3) of Brussels I to the 
effect that both it and Article 4(1) of Rome II exclude the place where any indirect consequences of 
the event giving rise to the damage occur.50 On this basis, the Court of Appeal held that the loss 
allegedly suffered within the meaning of Article 4(1) of Rome II was the conspiracy of the Russian 
defendants to damage the claimant’s right to payment under the loan and guarantee agreement. On 
the contrary, the non-payment of the facility agent to the claimant in London was merely an indirect 
consequence of the defendant’s payment in New York.51 
In the case of Hillside,52 the court was concerned with the interpretation of place of damage 
under Article 4(1) of Rome II in the context of financial loss arising from gambling. In this case, the 
Norwegian defendant threatened to sue an English gambling company in Norway for the losses he 
(the defendant) suffered while gambling on the claimants’ website. The claimants (an English 
gambling company) in response claimed against the Norwegian defendant in the English High Court 
for a declaration that it was not liable to the defendant in respect of any potential judgment the 
defendant obtains in Norway. One of the questions the High Court had to determine was whether the 
place where the damage occurred (under Article 4 of Rome II) in respect of the gambling financial 
loss suffered by the defendant was in England or Norway. The High Court in essence held that the 
place where the damage occurred was in England. 
In reaching that decision (of the place where the damage occurred), the High Court made 
express reference to recital 7 to Rome II, and applied the coherence of interpretation, by applying the 
CJEU jurisprudence under Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention and Brussels I to the effect that 
the “place where the damage occurred” under Article 4 of Rome II, was equivalent to the place where 
 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid at [90]. 
50 Ibid at [92] 
51 Ibid at [96]. See also Committeri (n 11) [33], [40]–[49]; FM Capital Partners Ltd v Marino [2018] EHWC 1708 (Comm) 
[490]–[497]. 
52 (n 1). 
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it “directly produced its harmful effects upon the person who is the immediate victim of that event” 
within the meaning of the CJEU’s case law under Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention and Brussels 
I.53 
 
2. Place of damage occurs in different countries 
 
There is the possibility that the direct damage might occur simultaneously in more than one country. 
In such a case, is a common law court to apply a single law, or different laws depending on the places 
where the direct damage occurs? In this connection, the Explanatory Memorandum to Rome II 
provides that: “The rule entails, where damage is sustained in several countries, that the laws of all 
the countries concerned will have to be applied on a distributive basis, applying what is known as 
‘Mosaikbetrachtung’ in German law.”54 
None of the recitals to Rome II explicitly provides a solution to this problem. At best recital 
15 to Rome II highlights the issue, but does not provide a solution. It provides that: 
The principle of the lex loci delicti commissi is the basic solution for non-contractual obligations in 
virtually all the Member States, but the practical application of the principle where component factors 
of the case are spread over several countries varies. This situation engenders uncertainty as to the law 
applicable. 
Some common law judges have regarded this issue as a controversial one, and have expressed 
tentative views.55 In Mx1 Limited (a company incorporated in Israel) Ses S.A. (a company 
incorporated in Luxembourg v Farahzad (“Farahzad”),56 Marcus Smith J in that case held that: 
In my judgment, the applicable law is not the place where the damage predominantly occurs. That is 
not what the Article says. Article 4(1) refers to the “the law of the country in which the  damage 
occurs.” The natural meaning is that where damage occurs across several jurisdictions, there will be 
several applicable laws.57 
We do not agree with the solution advanced by the Explanatory Memorandum and Marcus Smith J 
in Farahzad. It is submitted here that the correct and pragmatic approach is that a single law should 
apply. The better solution in such a case would be to apply the law of the place of principal damage 
to all the claims arising out of the tort. Where the law of the place of principal damage cannot be 
identified, the law of the habitual residence of the tortfeasor should apply as a default rule. Applying 
 
53 Ibid at [28]. 
54 Explanatory Memorandum (n 36) 11. 
55 Hillside (n 1) [46]; ICDL GCC Foundation (n 12) [9.5]–[9.8]; Innovia Films (n 1) [107]-[111]; Alfa Laval (n 12) 1155 
[21]–[24]. 
56 [2018] EWHC 1041 (Ch). 
57 Ibid at [44]. 
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the habitual residence of the tortfeasor as a default rule to the principal place of damage is justifiable 
on the basis that it should be regarded as the country of origin from which the direct damage emanates. 
This approach of applying a single law would be consistent with recitals 6 and 14 to Rome II 
that favour the aim of legal certainty and predictability in judicial proceedings. The Explanatory 
Memorandum and the judgment of Marcus Smith J in Farahzad must give way to the chief aim of 
Rome II – legal certainty and predictability. 
Second, it is simpler for practitioners and judges to apply a single law to a non-contractual 
obligation. Applying different laws complicates the exercise, and might lead to delay in judicial 
proceedings which compromises the sound administration of justice. 
Third, commercial necessity requires that a single law should be applied so as to reduce 
transaction and litigation costs. Pleading and proving a single foreign law is on its own expensive. 
Why should the parties incur more costs by pleading and proving other foreign laws? Moreover, the 
sound administration of justice would be compromised where one of the parties cannot fund the case 
due to lack of resources to plead different laws in a case. Indeed, parties who might expect that a 
single, less expensive law would resolve their non-contractual obligations would be disappointed to 
discover that different laws (which are expensive to plead and prove) are to be applied to their dispute. 
 
D. Article 4(2) of Rome II Regulation 
 
Article 4(2) of Rome II applies the law of the common habitual residence of the victim and tortfeasor 
in determining the applicable law. In this connection recital 18 to Rome II provides that: 
Article 4(2) should be seen as an exception to this general principle [Article 4(1)], creating a special 
connection where the parties have their habitual residence in the same country.58 
 In reality, Article 4(2) is an automatic exception to Article 4(1). Once Article 4(2) applies, 
Article 4(1) is automatically displaced, except where Article 4(1) is manifestly more closely 
connected to another country. 
Article 23 of Rome II provides a definition of habitual residence for parties acting in the course 
of their business. Article 23(1) defines the habitual residence of companies and other bodies, 
corporate or unincorporated, to be the place of central administration. However, Article 23(1) 
provides that: 
where the event giving rise to the damage occurs, or the damage arises, in the course of operation of a 
branch, agency or any other establishment, the place where the branch, agency or any other 
establishment is located shall be treated as the place of habitual residence. 
 
58 The words in square brackets are added into the quotation. 
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 Article 23(2) provides that the habitual residence of a natural person acting in the course of 
his or her business activity shall be his or her principal place of business. Rome II does not provide 
guidance on the determination of a natural person’s (not acting in the course of business) habitual 
residence. 
In common law jurisprudence, there are some points worth noting about Article 4(2). First, 
Article 4(2) is applied as a fixed connecting factor and not a presumption.59 Once Article 4(2) applies, 
the decision-maker regards Article 4(2) as a rule on its own, and would only disregard or displace 
Article 4(2) where another country is manifestly more closely connected to the tort. 
Second, common law judges have rejected the view that Article 4(2) only applies where a 
single tortfeasor is sued or involved in the tort.60 The rationale for this view is that restricting the 
application of Article 4(2) to where a single tortfeasor is sued is contrary to the legitimate expectations 
of the parties, upon which Article 4(2) is founded.61 It would also exclude the situation of a number 
of persons injured in a coach crash, for example.62 Thus, the natural wording of Article 4(2) is that it 
is applicable where more than one tortfeasor is sued or involved in the tort.63 
This approach is correct. Interpreting Article 4(2) as only applicable where a single tortfeasor 
is involved is a very narrow interpretation. Moreover, the fact that Article 4(2) is a strong exception 
to Article 4(1) does not mean that Article 4(2) should be unduly circumscribed. Article 4(2) should 
not be applied mechanically or without thought. It must be given some common sense interpretation 
that suits the realities of cross-border relations in torts. In effect, the approach of the common law 
judges in interpreting Article 4(2) is attentive to the realities of cross-border relations in torts. 
  Third, the time at which both parties (victim and tortfeasor) are habitually resident in a 
particular country where the damage occurred is key in applying Article 4(2), and the time at which 
proceedings are instituted is disregarded.64 Thus, in a motor accident in Germany involving two 
British nationals, where both were habitually resident in Germany at the time of the accident,65 the 
fact that the parties were both habitually resident in England at the time the proceedings were 
instituted was irrelevant to engage the Article 4(2) exception.66 
This approach is correct. To apply Article 4(2) depending on the movement of the parties, or 
stage of proceedings would introduce an unacceptable level of uncertainty in applying Rome II, which 
would be at odds with the Regulation’s principal objectives. This is a point that has been stressed by 
 
59 See also Moreno (n 12) [47]. 
60 Pickard v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [2015] EWHC 3421 [17] (Dingemans J); Pickard v Marshall [2017] EWCA Civ 17 




64 Jacobs (n 12); Winrow (n 12) [46]. 
65 Winrow (n 12) [51]. 
66 Ibid [41]-[43]. 
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some English judges in applying Article 4 of Rome II.67 It is also worthy of note that this potential 
uncertainty would affect more the application of Article 4(2), if it were to be applied depending on 
the movement of the parties, or stage of proceedings (rather than the time the damage occurs). In the 
case of Article 4(1), the initial damage is always the time at which the damage is sustained – any 
further damage in another country would be an indirect consequence of the tort. However, in Article 
4(2), the parties may both be habitually resident in country A at the time of the damage, but habitually 
resident in country B, at the time of instituting proceedings. 
Fourth, the habitual residence of the person claimed to be liable must be the habitual residence 
of the tortfeasor; it cannot be the habitual residence of the tortfeasor’s insurer.68 Thus, for example if 
C is the insurer of the tortfeasor, the habitual residence of C is irrelevant for the purpose of 
determining Article 4(2). This interpretation of Article 4(2) can only be correct. The tortfeasor is 
primarily liable to the victim of the tort and in reality the tortfeasor’s insurer has no relationship with 
the victim of the tort. The tortfeasor’s insurer only comes into the picture when the tortfeasor causes 
damage to the victim. To hold that the habitual residence of the person claimed to be liable includes 
the habitual residence of the insurer of the tortfeasor would lack common sense and lead to 
uncertainty. 
Fifth, Article 23 does not provide a definition of habitual residence for natural persons not acting 
in the course of business. In this connection, common law judges have filled the gap. It has been held 
that habitual residence is an autonomous concept.69 In effect, habitual residence is predominantly a 
question of fact rather than intention.70 In abstract terms, habitual residence of a natural person, not 
acting in the course of business, is defined as residence having a certain degree of permanence 
(stability) in a particular State or country. In Winrow the claimant’s habitual residence was analysed 
as follows: 
The claimant had been living and working in Germany for eight and a half years by the time of the accident. 
She was living there with her husband and three of their children were at school in Germany. The family 
remained living in Germany for a further 18 months after the accident. There was no evidence that during 
that time the family had a house in England. The residence of the claimant in Germany was established for 
a considerable period of time. The fact that the claimant and her family were living in Germany because 
the army had posted her husband there and that it was not his first choice did not render her presence there 
involuntary. He and his family were living in Germany because of his job. The situation of the claimant in 
Germany was similar to that of the spouses of other workers posted abroad. This is not an unusual situation. 
Having regard to the length of stay in the country, its purpose and the establishing of a life there - three 
 
67 Ibid at [52]. 
68 Jacobs (n 12) [39]; Winrow (n 12) [39]. 
69 Winrow (n 12) [40] - reliance placed on In Re LC (Children) [2014] 2 WLR; A v A (Children: Habitual Residence) 
[2014] AC 1; Mercredi v Chaffe (Case C-497/10 PPU) [2012] Fam 22 [47]. 
70 Winrow (n 12) [40]. 
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children were in an army run school in Germany and the claimant worked at an army base school – in my 
judgment the habitual residence of the claimant at the time of her accident was Germany.71 
This approach is correct. It may have been tempting for a common law judge to confuse domicile 
with habitual residence. If the concept of domicile had applied in the above case, English law would 
have applied on the basis that the claimant did not intend to make Germany her permanent abode. 
 
E. Article 4(3) of Rome II Regulation 
Article 4(3) displaces Article 4(1) and (2) where there is a manifestly closer connection with another 
country. In this connection recital 18 to Rome II provides that: 
Article 4(3) should be understood as an ‘escape clause’ from Article 4(1) and (2), where it is clear from 
all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with another 
country. 
  In addition, recital 14 to Rome II provides that: 
The requirement of legal certainty and the need to do justice in individual cases are essential elements 
of an area of justice. This Regulation provides for the connecting factors which are the most 
appropriate to achieve these objectives. Therefore, this Regulation provides for a general rule but also 
for…an ‘escape clause’ which allows a departure from these rules where it is clear from all the 
circumstance of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with another country. 
This set of rules thus creates a flexible framework of conflict-of-law rules. Equally, it enables the court 
siesed to treat individual cases in an appropriate manner. 
In this connection, some common law judges have observed that “escape clause” and “flexible 
framework” are not defined in the recitals.72 However, one of the authors of this article has provided 
the following definition: 
An escape clause is a provision inserted in a legal instrument to supplement or cure the defect in the 
principal connecting factor, where the law designated by the principal connecting factor has little or 
no connection with the dispute to be resolved before the court. Escape clauses honour the claim that 
no legal instrument is perfect and strive to improve the instrument by giving the court the discretion 
to locate the law of a country that is more or most closely connected with the subject-matter. In effect, 
escape clauses exist in choice of law because there is no connecting factor that is a perfect answer to 
the determination of the applicable law in the absence of choice. 
The escape clause honours the claim that rigid choice of law rules would not always satisfy the 
requirement of proximity. In effect, the role of the escape clause is to introduce flexibility in the 
 
71 Ibid [41]. 
72 OPO (n 17) [98]. See also M Pauknerová, “Escape Clauses and Legal Certainty in Private International Law” 
(2016/2017) XVIII Yearbook of Private International Law 61. 
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settlement of the conflict of laws and to best designate the country or legal system with the closest 
connection to the dispute.73 
The following points are worth noting on how the escape clause operates in English and Irish courts. 
First, the parties can explicitly or implicitly agree to exclude the operation of Article 4(3), and restrict 
their argument to Article 4(1) and Article 4(2).74 This approach saves time for both the parties and the 
court and also reduces litigation and transaction costs. 
Second, the burden of proof is on the party who wishes to displace Article 4(1) or Article 4(2), 
in order to apply Article 4(3).75 If for example party A argues that Article 4(3) is applicable to his case 
in order to displace Article 4(1) or Article 4(2), the burden of proof rests on party A to demonstrate 
why Article 4(3) should apply. In addition, if party A seeks to rely on Article 4(3) in order to displace 
Article 4(1) or Article 4(2) but does not rely on it before the court the judge is not obliged to consider 
the application of Article 4(3). 
In this connection, common law judges regard the standard of proof as high.76 In effect, they 
have described the criteria for applying Article 4(3) as “exceptional”77 and that the main rule should 
not “generally be disapplied”,78 because there is a “high standard”79 or “high threshold”,80 or “high 
hurdle” to invoke the escape clause.81 
By way of analogy, common law judges have held that the use of the phrases “clear from all 
the circumstances of the case” and “manifestly more closely connected” in Article 4(3) of Rome I 
indicate that the escape clause is an exceptional remedy that is to be rarely utilised in determining the 
law of a country that applies to a contract between the parties in the absence of choice.82 In effect, the 
CJEU jurisprudence interpreting the escape clause under the Rome Convention has to be followed 
with caution.83  As Popplewell J rightly holds: 
The text and architecture of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation is very different from that of the Rome 
Convention. In particular, the test is no longer expressed as one of closest connection; the test is that 
contained in the rules set out in Article 4.1 and 4.2, which are no longer expressed as presumptions or 
as being subject to the closest connection test; and the closest connection test has become an “escape 
clause” to be applied only where it is clear that the connection is manifestly closer to a country other 
 
73 CSA Okoli, Place of Performance: A Comparative Analysis (Hart, 2020) – forthcoming. 
74 Farahzad (n 56)  [32]. 
75Stylianou (n 12) [57]; Winrow (n 12) [42]. 
76Winrow ibid. 
77Fortress Value (n 12) [47]; Stylianou (n 12) [61], [64]; Moreno (n 12) [47]. 
78OPO (n 17) [112]. 
79Winrow (n 12) [42]. 
80Pan Oceanic Chatering Inc v UNIPEC UK Co Ltd [2016] EWHC 2774 (Comm) [209] (Carr J). 
81Winrow (n 12) [63]; Pickard v Motor Insurers’ Bureau (n 60) [20]; Pickard v Marshall (n 60) [8]; Rai v The Ministry of 
Defence [2016] 5WLUK 135 [117] (Mark Gargan J); Committeri (n 11) [57]. 
82See the Explanatory Memorandum (n 36) 12. 
83See generally Case C-133/08, Intercontainer (n 12); Case C-64/12 Schlecker (t/a Firma Anton Schlecker) v. Boedeker,  




than that dictated by the tests in Article 4.1 and 4.2, so that they are to be disregarded. The word “clear” 
reflects what the ECJ had already said was the effect of Article 4.5 of the Rome Convention in the 
Interfrigo case, but the word “manifestly” suggests a more stringent standard than before, as does the 
elevation of the criteria in Article 4.1 and 4.2 to tests from mere presumptions of closest connection. 
The new language and structure suggests a higher threshold, which requires that the cumulative weight 
of the factors connecting the contract to another country must clearly and decisively outweigh the 
desideratum of certainty in applying the relevant test in Article 4.1 and 4.2.84 
Third, common law judges rightly hold that all the circumstances of the case must be considered in 
interpreting Article 4(3), and reject a narrow approach in applying the escape clause.85 Thus, in one 
decided case Mark Gargan J rightly rejected the argument of counsel for one of the parties that a judge 
has to be 80% sure before he can effectively deploy Article 4(3).86 He also rightly rejected the 
argument of counsel that the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is the standard of proof for 
criminal proceedings applied to Article 4(3).87 In effect, common law judges do not unduly 
circumscribe the operation of Article 4(3). 
Fourth, Article 4(3) is very fact dependent. In other words, Article 4(3) operates based on the 
circumstances of the case. It is impossible to provide a precise criteria on how Article 4(3) works 
based on common law jurisprudence and practice. 
Fifth, Article 4(3) is not only used to displace Article 4(1) and Article 4(2). In common law 
practice, it can be used to confirm the application of Article 4(1) or (2).88 For example, if on the facts 
of a case Article 4(1) or (2) is the country of closest connection, the application of Article 4(3) can be 
used to confirm the correctness of applying Article 4(1) or Article 4(2). 
In practice, it can also be used to mediate between Article 4(1) and Article 4(2), so that 
although on the facts of a case Article 4(2) displaces Article 4(1), Article 4(3) can be used to restore 
the application of Article 4(1) based on a manifestly closer connection the tort has with the place of 
direct damage.89 For example, party A injures party B in a car accident in the Netherlands. Party A 
and B are both nationals of The Netherlands. The car involved in the accident was bought in The 
Netherlands, and is insured by a Dutch company. Party A and B both work for a subsidiary company 
(in Nigeria) of a Dutch parent company, and their employment relationship is governed by Dutch law. 
However, Party A and B have their common habitual residence in Nigeria. In this scenario, though on 
the facts of the case Article 4(2) automatically displaces Article 4(1) for Nigerian law to apply, Dutch 
 
84Molton Street Capital LLP v Shooters Hill Capital Partners LLP, Odeon Capital Group LLC [2015] EWHC 3419 [94]. 
85Stylianou (n 12) [62]; Winrow (n 12) [43]; OPO (n 17) [112] (Arden LJ); Pickard v Motor Insurers’ Bureau (n 60) [21]; 
Pickard v Marshall (n 60) [13]-[20]. See also Pan Oceanic Chartering (n 81) (Carr J). 
86Rai v The Ministry of Defence (n 82) [113]. 
87Ibid. 
88Hillside (n 1) [46].   
89See generally Pickard v Motor Insurers’ Bureau (n 60) [17]; Pickard v Marshall (n 60).   
17 
 
law is applicable under Article 4(3) because The Netherlands is manifestly more closely connected 
with the tort than Nigeria. 
Sixth, in interpreting Article 4(3) of Rome II, though all the circumstances of the case are to 
be considered, in common law practice some factors are more important than others. For example 
Article 4(1) and Article 4(2) are very relevant in interpreting Article 4(3), so that if Article 4(1) and 
(2) point to the same country, that is a very strong indicator (if not decisive) under Article 4(3) that 
the country in question is the applicable law.90 In reality, this is another way of saying that where 
Article 4(1) and Article 4(2) point to the same country, it is almost impossible to use Article 4(3) to 
displace Article 4(1) and Article 4(2).   
A pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties is a very significant (though not 
decisive) connecting factor that can trigger the application of Article 4(3) in displacing Article 4(1) 
or (2).91 Thus, in the Irish case of Allied Irish Bank Plc and others v Diamond and Others92 there 
were different contractual and non-contractual relationships and causes of action (involving multiple 
parties) before the court. In a bid to consolidate proceedings, the court utilised Irish law under Article 
4(3) because it governed all the employment relationships between the parties in the case.93 
It is controversial among common law judges whether pursuit of proceedings in a particular 
country is a very relevant connecting factor that can trigger the application of Article 4(3). Sir Robert 
Nelson J held that the pursuit of proceedings in a particular forum is an important factor in interpreting 
Article 4(3),94 while Slade J held that pursuit of proceedings in a particular forum is “not a strong 
connecting factor” in interpreting Article 4(3).95 In this connection, it is submitted that it is Slade J 
who holds the correct view. To regard the pursuit of proceedings in a particular forum as an important 
factor in interpreting Article 4(3) is misconceived because it conflates choice of law with jurisdiction, 
as if they were the same. Moreover, such an interpretation encourages forum shopping. A party would 
simply invoke a particular forum just to gain the advantage of applying the law of the forum. This is 
not to say applying the law of the forum is a bad thing; it is actually a good thing if done legitimately 
within the confines of Rome II. In effect, the applicable law cannot be determined based on what 
court assumes jurisdiction in the EU. Indeed, recital 6 to Rome II provides that: 
The proper functioning of the internal market creates a need, in order to improve the predictability of the 
outcome of litigation, certainty as to the law applicable and the free movement of judgments, for the 
 
90 Winrow (n 12) [43], [62]. 
91 Allied Irish Bank (n 16) [4.19]–[4.20]. See also Hillside (n 1) [46]. Cf. Alfa Laval (n 12) [21]–[24]; Erste Group (n 11) 
[97]. 
92 (n 12).   
93 In Hillside (n 1) [46] English law which was held to be the applicable law of the contract between the claimant and 
defendant, was utilised as one of the significant connecting factors to govern their non-contractual obligation under Art 
4(3) of Rome II. Though in this case, Art 4(3) was used to confirm the application of Art 4(1) rather than to disapply it. 
94Stylianou (n 12) [79]-[82]. 
95Winrow (n 12) [61].   
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conflict-of-law rules in the Member States to designate the same national law irrespective of the country 
of the court in which an action is brought. 
Sir Robert Nelson J’s interpretation breaches the provisions of Recital 6 to Rome II and should be 
regarded as decided in error. 
In common law practice, other less relevant factors in interpreting Article 4(3) of Rome II are 
the place of indirect damage or consequential loss, factors relating to the parties, habitual residence 
of the parties at the time of judicial proceedings (if different from the time the damage occurred), 
common nationality, habitual residence of the tortfeasor’s insurer which is joined as a party, and the 
place where the motor vehicle was insured and registered in the case of a traffic accident.96 
Seventh, some common law judges have held that there is a strong relationship between the 
common law concept of forum non conveniens and Article 4(3), though they are not to be confused 
as one and the same.97 As Lord Sumption rightly holds: 
It is undoubtedly convenient for the country of the forum to correspond with that of the proper law. It 
is also true that both jurisdiction and choice of law can broadly be said to depend on how closely the 
dispute is connected with a particular country.98  
Thus, if the tort is manifestly more closely connected with a particular country under Article 4(3), 
that country would qualify as the natural forum under the concept of forum non conveniens. In effect, 
a useful comparison and analogy can be made between the concept of closest connection and forum 
non conveniens. This is a very interesting point that requires further academic study.99 
In the final analysis, it is suggested that one must be careful not to use the concept of stare decisis 
to slavishly interpret Article 4(3) of Rome II. A connecting factor which is less significant or irrelevant 
in one case, might turn out to be a strong connecting factor in interpreting Article 4(3) of Rome II in 
another case. In effect, care must be taken to ensure that one is unfettered by precedent in interpreting 
Article 4(3) of Rome II. The facts of the instant case must be carefully evaluated before deciding 
whether the application of Article 4(3) has been triggered. Of course, these common law decisions 
will continue to serve as guides particularly for practitioners, but they should not be applied 





96 Winrow (n 12) [39], [48]– [60]; Stylianou (n 12) [50]; Alliance Bank (n 1).  On the concept of forum non conveniens 
see generally Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex Ltd. [1987] AC 460. 
97 Stylianou (n 12) [63]–[64], [83].   
98 Brownlie (n 17) [77]. 
99 The first author is interested in doing some empirical study on the concept of forum non conveniens. 
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Rome II has been in operation for over ten years. No legislator or scholar could have exhaustively 
envisaged how Article 4 of Rome II would work in practice. It is the judge’s role to interpret the law 
and this requires that the judge clarifies ambiguities and, on occasion, fill gaps that might arise from 
the application of legislative provisions in cross-border litigation. If one were to ask: how do we rate 
the judgments of English and Irish courts on Article 4 of Rome II? Our general response would be 
“excellent”. The decisions of English and Irish courts on Article 4 of Rome II have generally been 
consistent, harmonious, insightful, and impressive. This is not to say they have been perfect in 
interpreting Article 4 of Rome II. Perfection is a utopia. 
Section C dealt with the operation of Article 4(1) of Rome II. First, a coherence of 
interpretation is desirable between Article 4(1) of Rome II and Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia in 
interpreting the concept of direct damage.  Second, where the place of damage occurs in different 
countries, a single law should be identified to govern the entire tortious claim. 
Section D dealt with the operation of Article 4(2) of Rome II. Article 4(2) operates as an 
automatic exception to Article 4(1). First, the concept of a non-business natural person’s common 
habitual residence is not defined within the measure but it is to be viewed as distinct from the concepts 
of common domicile, common nationality and common ordinary residence. Second, the time at which 
the damage occurs, and not the time proceedings are instituted, is used in applying Article 4(2). 
Section E dealt with the operation of Article 4(3) of Rome II. Article 4(3) operates as an escape 
clause to Article 4(1) and Article 4(2). It is to be applied exceptionally, though its operation is not to 
be unduly circumscribed. All the circumstances of the instant case must be taken into account in 
interpreting Article 4(3) and determining what weight is to be given to the connecting factors in issue.  
The decisions observed within this article demonstrate that English and Irish judges have 
remained true to the spirit of the measure of their interpretation and application of Rome II, despite 
the fact that its present rules present a regime so distinct from that which was previously in place in 
England and Ireland. In this regard, they have approached the measure with caution so as not to 
exercise their usual degree of judicial discretion. Such an approach would be at odds with the 
Regulation’s chief objective of attaining legal certainty and consistency of outcome. In their approach, 
English and Irish judges have averted the propensity to apply the law of the forum, known as the 
‘homing instinct’ and correctly interpreted the legislative intention that lies behind Article 4 – long 
may it continue. 
 
